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T
he prevailing view is that connecting the 
unconnected using digital technologies is 
necessarily a good thing for society as a whole, 
for the economy and for the individual. 
Although the relationship between infrastructure 
and digital platform development and inequality is 
complicated, policymakers tend to assume that 
their interventions will have a direct and positive 
impact on the take up and use of digital 
technologies and services, and a consequential 
beneficial impact on society. The main focus in 
policy is to reduce the access and literacy divides 
and, as a result, attention is given principally to the 
rate of investment in digital infrastructures and in 
digital skills acquisition.
In Europe, for example, the policy focus is on 
three pillars in the European Commission’s digital 
single market strategy: the economy; broadband 
connectivity and access; and skills and employment. 
Regarding the economy, concern in Europe about 
the very considerable market power of large 
platform operating companies leads to measures 
intended to remove barriers to the growth of the 
single market. Policy interventions include the 
lengthy Competition Directorate case against 
Google that may or may not succeed in altering the 
company’s strategy. They include efforts to remove 
national market barriers, such as geo-blocking 
practices that result in less than 4% of all video 
on-demand in the European Union being accessible 
across member state borders. There are initiatives to 
boost investment in broadband infrastructure, 
especially in rural areas. Other market interventions 
are designed to support news content creation, such 
as a proposed fees levy on digital platforms operated 
by Google and others, and efforts to tackle the tax 
base are under discussion, such as the challenge  
to Ireland’s tax concessions for Apple and the 
introduction of tighter regulations on how platform 
company revenues are assessed.
European policy in addition requires user consent 
for the use of personal data to address the absence  
of corporate transparency in the way consumer 
information is used. The European Commission’s 
General Data Protection Regulation introduced ‘data 
protection by design’ and ‘data protection by default’ 
measures with the aim of reducing the risks 
associated with online interaction. 
When the US Federal Communications 
Commission introduced its new rules for internet 
service provider use of personal data and certain 
kinds of metadata, these were greeted by advertisers 
as ‘unprecedented, misguided, counterproductive, 
and potentially extremely harmful’. In Europe, by 
contrast, a lengthy set of deliberations on updated 
policy measures for personal data protection  
has produced a somewhat more muted response 
from industry.
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ARE WE LOSING 
CONTROL?
The current path of digital technology innovation is seen as inevitable and good  
for the economy and citizens. But as ROBIN MANSELL writes, there are looming  
and profound questions about digital divides we cannot ignore 
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ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE
Some of the policy interventions in response to the 
spread of digital technologies and services are 
explicitly aimed at achieving fairness in the 
treatment of citizens and greater transparency with 
regard to corporate practices. Nevertheless, the 
dominant theme in policy discussions concerns the 
prospects for the digital economy, and the highest 
priority is to promote an increase in the rate of 
investment in both infrastructure and online 
services and to do so by ensuring that the economic 
incentives facing infrastructure and platform 
providers encourage such investment. Even when 
policymakers succeed in encouraging shifts in 
business strategy in an effort to ensure that citizen 
interests are protected, such policy interventions 
mainly tinker with the direction of innovation in 
digital technologies.
Rarely, if ever, do they lead to substantial changes 
in the pathway or trajectory of digital innovation, 
which is currently leading to an increasingly more 
intensely mediated digital environment. As Hannu 
Nieminen comments, these interventions are aimed 
at ‘patching the gaps’ left by global regulators 
which themselves no longer exercise control over 
the activities of the providers of digital technologies 
and services.1 Each new generation of technology is 
expected to help to close digital divides; to get more 
people connected and to boost the use of digital 
services. This expectation is evident in the 
enthusiasm in the press and policy circles for 5G 
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wireless services. At a cost in Europe for 5G rollout 
of some e57 billion by 2020, the benefit is 
estimated at some e113 billion for the European 
single market by 2025.2 The emphasis is on the 
economic drivers, with an assumption that the 
deployment of this technology will bring a new 
chance to close the digital divides.
With regard to digital skills, the policy focus  
is increasingly on 
upskilling. Concern is 
growing in Europe (and 
in the US) that a low level 
of certain skills is 
preventing major 
advances in deploying 
new generations of 
technology as well as 
restricting the abilities of citizens to benefit fully 
from their access to digital networks. Only some 
1.7% of European enterprises are reported to make 
full use of advanced digital technologies and 
around 41% do not use them at all. Some 47% of  
the European Union’s population does not have 
appropriate digital skills, but 90% of jobs are 
forecast to require at least some level of digital skills 
by 2025. The European Commission’s 2016 Skills 
Agenda for Europe emphasises the need for skills in 
computer science, nanotechnology, artificial 
intelligence (AI) and robotics. It also notes the need 
to strengthen transversal skills such as team work, 
creative thinking and problem-solving, but it is 
The dominant 
theme in policy 
discussions is 
prospects for the 
digital economy. 
Technological systems are acknowledged as being instruments 
of power, and an understanding of the way power relations are 
mediated by digital technologies is essential for the analysis of 
the cultural, social, political and economic features of society. 
Digital divides are examined in several generations of research 
which seek an understanding of relationships between the 
spread of digital technologies and the factors contributing to 
the inclusion or exclusion of countries, regions and people in 
the digitally mediated world. There are three ‘traditions’: 
O The first digital divide tradition investigates the access divide. 
It is very prominent and is primarily an ‘instrumental’ research 
tradition. The main goal in this tradition is to connect the 
unconnected to digital networks, typically using broadband 
technology. Numerous reports of this kind are generated by 
consultancy firms, academics, United Nations agencies and the 
World Bank. These document the rate of diffusion and take up 
of digital technologies, networks and services, usually with the 
aim of ranking performance and assessing whether access gaps 
are being closed. Research in this instrumental digital divide 
tradition confirms that a rapid rate of investment in digital 
technologies and services is strongly associated with declining 
economic inequality, at least on a global scale.
O A second, deepening digital divide tradition focuses on  
the skills, literacies and competencies required to make  
use of digital technologies once access is achieved. In the 
Netherlands, for instance, only 15% of the population can be 
counted among the information or digital elite, despite the 
relatively high levels of connectivity in the country.11
O A third tradition in the digital divide literature gives greater 
attention to the outcomes of connectivity. Alexander van 
Deursen and Ellen Helsper, for instance, are interested in 
measuring the differential economic, social, cultural and 
individual outcomes of internet use.12 They examine the 
tangible differences that users associate with their use of the 
internet and what they can achieve in their lives. Manuel 
Castells and Pekka Himanen also focus on outcomes.13 They link 
indicators of digital access with differences in economic 
development, human development, ecological sustainability 
and cultural development to assess the extent to which human 
dignity is enhanced as a result of internet access and use. 
Sometimes other digital divides are discussed in the literature, 
referring to gaps in internet use between the old and the  
young, to gender differences, to the exclusion of the disabled or 
to gaps in access between urban and rural areas. The labels of 
these traditions and the categories vary, and much of the 
research in the digital divide tradition focuses on quantitative 
indicators and is undertaken at a relatively high level of 
aggregation. However, this work is complemented by numerous 
case studies, many of which employ qualitative methods to 
examine access and technology use barriers. For example, 
exclusionary business practices may be revealed – such as the 
levying of service fees of as much as 16% of the value of 
transactions on mobile money transactions in some African 
countries, which serves as a barrier to use and reinforces 
economic divides, as Kas Kalba writes.14
It is the first and second digital divide traditions that seem to 
have the most influence in policymaking, despite the fact that 
these traditions give the least attention to questions about why 
digital technology innovation yields persistent, unequal 
outcomes in society.
POWER AND TRADITIONS OF DIGITAL DIVIDES
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STEM subjects – science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
– that receive the highest priority, together with occasional references 
to the arts in relation to creativity. Changes in education provision at 
the higher education level are deemed to be urgent to reduce barriers 
to market growth in big data analytics and the internet of things (IoT). 
These are expected to contribute some e415 billion to the EU’s future 
gross domestic product.
Should strong growth be achieved, this is assumed to be consistent 
with greater choice for consumers and with generating new sources of 
employment. The emphasis in policy initiatives in this context is on 
investment in R&D to promote faster innovation and to strengthen 
economic growth in the single European digital market. 
Many policy papers addressing these issues embrace a discourse that 
signals a concern about the disruptive nature of technological change 
and about the need to ensure that social justice is achieved, together 
with transparency. However, the main focus is on access and skills and 
on closing gaps in the relatively short term. Rarely is there a discussion 
about the implications of the rate and the direction of technological 
change in the longer term. Yet Martin Goos and colleagues find that it 
is likely to take “at least 60 years for Europe’s lagging regions to close 
half of their current lack of high-tech employment compared to 
Europe’s high-tech hubs”, based on current technologies and expected 
rates of investment.3 
The longer term implications for inequality are also signalled by 
Andrew Keen, who finds that the growing use of digital tools helps to 
explain the gaps between rich and poor.4 He observes that “the more 
we use the contemporary digital network, the less economic value  
it is bringing to us. Rather than promoting economic fairness, it is a 
central reason for … the hollowing out of the middle class.” 
Similarly, the late Anthony Atkinson’s assessment was that, even if 
full employment could be achieved, a structural shift towards higher 
skilled labour associated with the types of skills required in the digital 
economy is likely to result in a more unequal distribution of income.5 
This is partly explained by a growing concentration of rents from 
technology and trade which are accruing to an increasingly smaller 
number of companies, by steeper pay hierarchies and by a shift from 
fixed salaries to other forms of pay, such as zero-hours contracts.
ASSUMPTION OF BENEFIT 
These are all factors that fall outside the models used to examine 
digital divides and their consequences. This suggests that policymakers 
are focusing on a narrow range of issues informed by the instrumental 
digital divide traditions and there is little acknowledgement of the 
need for a debate about the consequences of the direction of change in 
digital technologies and services. It is recognised that the direction of 
digital technology innovation is affecting the income distribution of 
populations as a result of the automation of labour, and some 
estimates put the jobs at risk from computerisation in the form of 
sensors, IoT, algorithms and machine learning, and robotics at nearly 
50% in as little as three decades. Nevertheless, the underlying 
assumption is that technological change will bring more benefits than 
losses for individuals and societies, albeit in the long term. 
The evidence suggests at the same time, however, that deep social 
and economic inequalities are persistent and unlikely to be reduced by 
tinkering with the rate of technological change or with upskilling in 
relatively narrowly defined advanced technology fields. Yet persistent 
inequality undermines commitments to democracy and the capacity 
of individuals to generate an income to live a decent life; one that  
is safe, and one that offers them a possibility for improving their 
wellbeing and regard for their self-worth and that of others.
Economists such as Joseph Stiglitz are calling for progressive income 
and wealth taxes and a strengthening of the social safety net in the 
face of threats to people’s livelihoods. However, those who propose 
these kinds of measures also remain oddly committed to the view that 
there is a natural or inevitable direction to change in digital 
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technologies. In addition, because work in the 
digital divide tradition and policy is focused on 
access and on the use of the technologies and 
services that have already been deployed outside  
the laboratory, there is little discussion about  
the consequences of the current direction of 
technological innovation. Debate about how human 
beings will live and experience their lives when 
technologies that are still in the laboratory emerge 
is not the highest priority in policymaking circles 
concerned with the digital economy.
This commitment to a particular direction of 
technological change operates as a monopoly of 
knowledge or, in Charles Taylor’s terms, as a 
dominant social imaginary.6 The prevailing view 
when discussion focuses on digital divides treats 
promoting connectivity and upskilling as the main 
solutions to economic and social inequality. The 
logic is that inclusion is likely to be achieved 
optimally when the competitive market serves as 
the driver. Social benefits (and costs) are regarded as 
the derived outcomes of success in the digital 
marketplace.7 Political economist Harold Innis 
warned that “obsession with economic 
considerations illustrates the dangers of monopolies 
of knowledge and suggests the necessity of 
appraising its limitations”.8 This was a trenchant 
criticism of an obsessive focus on the factors 
determining economic growth in the 1940s when 
little attention was being given to distributional 
issues or to the social and political consequences of 
unequal wealth accumulation.
In today’s context, this monopoly of knowledge is 
insistent that digital platforms and increasingly 
sophisticated computerised information processing 
will bring good things for citizens. Provided 
through globally competitive markets, these 
platforms optimise consumer choice and 
technology suppliers are seen as simply responding 
to consumer demand. Ultimately – in the long run 
– there will be no power asymmetries. The main 
focus is on the rate of investment in technological 
innovation and on the introduction of more 
sophisticated digital products and services. In this 
context, there are references to the need to 
moderate market developments to achieve the 
common good, however it is defined. Such 
moderation generally means only that it is 
acknowledged that technology itself is not a 
solution to social and economic problems. Jeffrey 
Sachs, director of the Earth Institute at Columbia 
University, says, for example, that technology must 
be properly deployed – directed towards social 
purposes – and extended to the poor and to remote 
regions that markets alone will not serve, at least 
not in a timely way. Put simply, technology must be 
combined with a will towards the common good.
Whatever the imagined consensus as to what the 
common good may be, it is principally associated 
There is little questioning of 
the direction of change in 
digital technologies.  
D I G I T A L  D I V I D E
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with the rate of investment in infrastructure and 
skills. There is little questioning of the direction  
of change in digital technologies. The present 
trajectory is yielding benefits for healthcare, 
education, financial services, smart agriculture and 
many other sectors. Investment in experimental 
research and in bringing new applications to users 
is reducing the costs of deploying some services and 
it may enable enhanced public awareness and 
citizen engagement or contribute to productivity 
gains and improved market efficiency.
Nevertheless, the longer-term consequences of the 
direction of technological change go unquestioned 
because the present pathway for technological 
innovation is presumed to be the only one available.
CONCLUSION
Is it realistic to envisage a deeper consideration  
of the consequences of contemporary digital 
technology innovation? Policy measures are being 
introduced to limit the damage caused by accidents 
resulting from experimentation in the laboratory 
and the excesses of practices in the private sector. 
Legislation and regulation play important roles  
in addressing the short-run consequences of 
contemporary developments and such interventions 
do alter the incentives of private, state and, indeed, 
civil society actors, leading to incremental changes 
in the direction of innovation. Platform operators 
and infrastructure providers will continue to seek 
public legitimacy for their practices in order to 
ensure the financial sustainability of their business 
models, but these will amount to small shifts in 
strategy with technological innovation continuing 
to progress along its current trajectory.
Such tinkering is unlikely to address the principal 
contradiction – that the more digitally mediated 
benefits we have, the fewer opportunities there are 
for humans to exercise their control and authority. 
The risks that augmented machine intelligence 
presents for human beings are being addressed 
through risk-mitigation strategies that involve 
further progress towards algorithmic complexity.  
As calculative practices are internalised by citizens, 
this limits the capacity of human beings to imagine 
alternative directions for technological innovation.9
While it is recognised that developments in AI  
and robotics “hold the potential to reshape 
fundamentally the way we live and work”10 and that 
there is a need for ethical scrutiny of the societal 
consequences, the prevailing view is that society 
must adapt to the current pathway of technological 
change. A dialogue is needed but this raises the 
question of what kind of dialogue. Alternative 
directions for change are themselves mediated by 
our immersion within the technological system.  
It is difficult to envisage how citizens without 
in-depth scientific knowledge can be expected to 
actively participate in such a dialogue. This is 
especially so because some 71% of Europeans, for 
example, report that they believe there is no 
alternative to disclosing their personal information 
to obtain products or services, according to the 
European Commission.
Nevertheless, there is no alternative to 
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deliberation. When social and economic inequality persists and digital 
technologies are implicated, it is crucial to enable a dialogue that may 
reveal alternative pathways which challenge the presumed natural 
direction of digital innovation. The obsession with economic growth at 
the heart of the prevailing monopoly of knowledge may be diluted 
through attention to the increasingly visible and extreme consequences 
of economic and social inequality. Any such dialogue must focus on 
what people will do in their lives and how they will live together with 
authority and dignity. This must be a dialogue about what people value 
in their lives when they are mediated by digital technologies, not 
simply about the values that come to be embedded in technologies as 
they emerge from laboratory. It is urgent that such a dialogue is 
undertaken, that it is inclusive and that choices are acted upon.
ROBIN MANSELL is professor of new media and the internet, London School 
of Economics and Political Science. This article is adapted from the paper, 
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CONTRADICTORY RELATIONS 
BETWEEN HUMANS AND MACHINES
Once the stuff of science fiction, developments in robotics and 
artificial intelligence (AI) could bring substantial risks if the view is 
taken that human beings should retain control of their digital 
environment. If the trajectory of change is one that is likely to remove 
human authority over the technological system, it must be asked 
whether this would destroy the very notion of what it means to be 
human. These developments are encouraged by the view that there is 
a natural course of development of digital technology. 
The promise is that the benefits will outweigh the risks even though 
developments in machine learning suggest that the asymmetry 
between humans and their machines is being exacerbated. Some 
scholars, activists and policymakers are making efforts to mitigate the 
risks of underemployment and social and economic exclusion as well 
as other harms to human beings. Critical scholarship is demonstrating 
how far the commodity form of online engagement is reaching into 
citizen’s lives and providing increasingly robust evidence of algorithm 
system biases, whether racial, gendered or income related.15 Despite 
such evidence and claims that the direction of innovation is yielding 
an ‘infoglut’ and a black-boxed technological system which is not 
transparent for citizens, the technological development pathway 
continues to be one where the operations of the algorithmic system 
are becoming less transparent and accountable.
On the current pathway of technological change in the digital 
world, the results of data analytics, often in the form of visualisations 
of patterned associations, are shaping decisions in society.16 
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